The compliance verification of latent failure has significant impact on the system safety level of aircraft. After a decade argument, EASA added new requirements of latent failure in CS/AMC 25.1309. For example, any significant latent failure is eliminated as far as possible. In order to prevent the aircraft from one failure away from catastrophe, for each catastrophic failure condition that results from two failures, either one of which is latent for more than one flight, the time of operating is required to be limited from the latency point, meanwhile the combined average probability of all the single active failures is required to be limited from the residual probability point, assuming one single latent failure has occurred. In view of new requirement of latent failure in CS 25.1309(b), its methods of compliance are analyzed. Two criteria limit latency and limit residual probability, are illustrated by minimal cut set of typical Fault Tree Analysis example. The application scope is analyzed from the engineering point of view, and the calculation methods of probability and exposure time limit of latent failure are illustrated, to promote system safety level of aircraft.